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Abstract: This research investigates how two supply chain members, a downstream firm 5 
(F) and an upstream supplier (S), interact with each other with respect to corporate social 6 
responsibility (CSR) behaviour and what impact exogenous parameters may have on this 7 
interaction. A game-theoretic analysis is conducted to obtain equilibriums for both 8 
simultaneous-move and sequential-move CSR games. Under certain assumptions, it is 9 
concluded that (1) there exists a mutual incentive between their CSR behaviour, whereby a 10 
win-win performance in terms of both CSR and profitability is achieved as long as exogenous 11 
parameters exceed certain critical thresholds; (2) A higher consumer marginal social-benefit 12 
potential (MSBP) or a lower consumer marginal perception difficulty (MPD) helps to lower the 13 
critical thresholds of CSR budgets and CSR operational efficiency by S and F, making it easier 14 
to achieve the win-win performance; (3) An increase in one supply chain member’s CSR 15 
budget or CSR operational efficiency tends to make the supply chain easier to attain a win-win 16 
performance scenario; (4) if CSR decisions are made sequentially, a prior commitment to CSR 17 
activities from one supply chain member strengthens the mutual incentive and facilitates the 18 
realization of the win-win performance. Business implications of these research findings are 19 
also discussed. 20 
Keywords: Supply chain management; corporate social responsibility; game theory; mutual 21 
incentive; commitment 22 
 23 
1. Introduction 24 
With the continued trend of globalization, more and more firms have been taking advantage of 25 
global supply chains to improve their competitive edge by lowering cost, accelerating product 26 
development, and getting access to natural and human resources in the international arena 27 
(Boyd et al. 2004). As firms enjoy the benefits, many leading global brands such as Nike, GAP, 28 
Adidas, and McDonalds have been faced with intense pressure for socially responsible supply 29 
chain management (Amaeshi et al. 2008). A commonly observed response to this pressure is 30 
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that the primary firm introduces codes of conduct to ensure its partners’ business practices to 31 
be socially responsible (Pedersen and Andersen 2006). However, World Bank (2003) reports 32 
the difficulty in implementing these codes of conduct due to a wide variety of individual codes 33 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR), the effectiveness of the top-down CSR structure, and 34 
insufficient understanding of business benefits of CSR commitment. 35 
CSR has historically been a significant theme in the business community and attracted 36 
considerable research interests from academia. For instance, a survey of the Economist (2005) 37 
shows that 85% of 136 executives and 65 investors view CSR as a “central” or “important” 38 
consideration in making investment decisions. Different lines of research have been conducted 39 
to examine CSR, including qualitative analysis (Bowen 1953, Friedman 1970), empirical 40 
investigations on the relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance (Orlitzky 41 
et al. 2003, Margolis and Walsh 2001, González-Benito and González-Benito 2005), and 42 
formal modeling of CSR (Baron 2001, 2007, Calveras et al. 2007, Giovanni and Giacinta 43 
2007).  44 
Currently, the majority of research on CSR focuses on individual firms. Recently, 45 
researchers have extended the view on CSR and investigated CSR from a supply chain 46 
management perspective. Research in this emerging field has taken on different avenues. For 47 
qualitative discussions, with the belief that the primary member of a supply chain is morally 48 
obligated to manage other members’ CSR activities, Boyd et al. (2004) provide a nine-step 49 
procedure for supply chain CSR management. Amaeshi et al. (2008) suggest that the more 50 
powerful member in a supply chain bears a responsibility to influence the weaker member(s). 51 
Empirically, Carter et al. (2000) show that environmental purchasing has significant impact on 52 
both income and cost. Carter and Jennings (2002) find a positive relationship between CSR and 53 
supplier performance. And more recently, Miao et al. (2011) use a sample of Chinese firms to 54 
explore the antecedents of logistics social responsibility. Ageron et al. (2011) take advantage of 55 
a French sample to provide a list of enabling conditions and critical success factors for 56 
sustainable supply management. In addition, mathematical models have been established to 57 
investigate CSR in supply chains. For instance, Savaskan et al. (2004) identify an appropriate 58 
supply chain structure for original equipment manufacturers in closed-loop supply chains with 59 
product remanufacturing. Cruz (2008) develops a dynamic multi-criteria decision-making 60 
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framework to derive the equilibriums for supply chain networks with environmental (social) 61 
responsibility, and the basic assumption is that environmental responsibility does not directly 62 
affect market demand. Cruz and Wakolbinger (2008) extend Cruz （2008）to a multi-period 63 
setting to capture the long-term effect of CSR activities. Hsueh and Chang (2008) demonstrate 64 
that system-wide optimization can be achieved by appropriately allocating social responsibility 65 
via monetary transfers among members in a supply chain network. Ni et al. (2010) examine 66 
social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains, where the two supply chain 67 
members are bound by a wholesale price contract. A key issue is to determine who should be 68 
allocated as the responsibility holder with the right of offering the contract that is designed to 69 
characterize the transfer mechanism of social responsibility cost incurred by the supplier. 70 
Another concern in Ni et al. (2010) is to examine how this right should be appropriately 71 
restricted.  72 
Taking a strategic CSR view (Baron 2001), this paper attempts to understand how two 73 
supply chain members, a downstream firm (F) and an upstream supplier (S), interact with each 74 
other with respect to CSR behaviour in a game-theoretic setting and what impact exogenous 75 
factors may have on this interaction and equilibriums. Compared to the otherwise identical 76 
product sold by competitors in the final market, the product provided by the supply chain 77 
differs with certain CSR commitment that is expected to bring consumers with additional 78 
benefits depending on consumers’ perceptions. This assumption aims to address empirical 79 
findings about the effect of CSR performance on consumer’s willingness-to-pay in Mohr and 80 
Webb (2005) and De Pelsmacker et al. (2005) and reflects the view that CSR performance can 81 
be viewed as a device for both vertical and horizontal product differentiation (McWilliams et al. 82 
2006). The final market is assumed to be competitive via price, and this price competition 83 
results in a CSR-dependent demand function for the supply chain product due to the 84 
differentiation by CSR performance. With this demand function, a dynamic three-stage game 85 
model is established to characterize the strategic interaction between S and F in the 86 
two-echelon supply chain where the first stage is to capture the behavioural interaction 87 
regarding CSR conduct and the last two stages are a standard description of the good/service 88 
transaction in a supply chain with a wholesale contract. More specifically, Section 2 considers 89 
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a simultaneous-move CSR game where S and F simultaneously determine their individual CSR 90 
commitment prior to F’s purchase decision from S at a wholesale price set by S, F then sells the 91 
product or service in a final consumer market. Section 3 examines the situation that S and F 92 
declare their individual commitment to CSR activities sequentially (For example, in its 2006 93 
annual CSR report, Starbucks announced (committed) the target percentage (66.9%) of 2007 94 
paper using that is made of post-consumer fiber), and this modified game is referred to as the 95 
sequential-move CSR game.  96 
With the simultaneous-move CSR game, it is demonstrated that a mutual incentive exists 97 
between F and S and this mutual incentive leads to a win-win result in the sense that both the 98 
CSR and economic performance can be enhanced as long as exogenous parameters exceed 99 
certain thresholds (Proposition 2 and 3). Subsequently, it is explored how these thresholds are 100 
affected by each exogenous parameter (Proposition 4). An examination of the sequential-move 101 
CSR game reveals that the prior commitment to CSR activities by one member strengthens the 102 
mutual incentive and makes the win-win performance more likely to be realized by 103 
coordinating their social responsibility activities. The enhancement of the mutual incentive is 104 
reflected in the relaxation of the critical conditions for achieving the win-win performance 105 
(Proposition 5).  106 
The research reported in this article falls within the category of mathematical modeling, 107 
but the models here significantly differ from the existing approaches. Savaskan et al. (2004) 108 
focus on the efficiency differences among four supply chain structures while we demonstrate 109 
how a win-win scenario can be achieved via the mutual incentive between S and F, and this 110 
incentive may be further strengthened if a member is willing to declare its CSR commitment 111 
ahead of another member’s CSR decision. In the multi-criteria decision-making framework, 112 
Cruz (2008) considers the cost associated with CSR activities and ignores the benefit of CSR 113 
commitment on market demand, but the research here accommodates both cost and benefit of 114 
CSR. More importantly, this article attempts to understand how to reach a win-win solution 115 
through strategic interaction between the two supply chain members while Cruz (2008) and 116 
Cruz and Wakolbinger (2008) explore the dynamic evolution of product flows, associated 117 
product prices, and different levels of social responsibility activities in supply chain networks. 118 
In Hsueh and Chang (2008), the proposed strategy for coordinating CSR in a supply chain 119 
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network is accomplished by monetary transfers that are assumed to be exogenously binding, 120 
while the models here investigate how CSR activities endogenously interact. As for the 121 
difference from the research reported in Ni et al. (2010), this article assumes that each supply 122 
chain member incurs its individual CSR cost and the focus is to examine the strategic 123 
interaction between the two members. On the other hand, Ni et al. (2010) consider the situation 124 
that the cost associated with CSR only incurs by S and is expected to be shared with F through 125 
a wholesale price contract.  126 
This research differs from the literature on the impact of quality and/or service on market 127 
demand in industrial organization (Tirole 1988) where quality/service reflects a vertical 128 
differentiation attribute of a product and a higher quality or service level always provides 129 
positive extra benefits to all consumers. On the other hand, the CSR performance here is 130 
modeled with both vertical and horizontal differentiation aspects where a product with CSR 131 
commitment may provide positive or negative extra benefits depending on consumers’ 132 
perceptions. In addition, the research here focuses on the mutual incentive of CSR conduct 133 
between the upstream and downstream players, but the literature on quality improvement 134 
incentives under quality-related cost sharing contracts usually does not explicitly consider the 135 
impact of quality improvement on final demand or the downstream service competition/ 136 
coordination in the final market. More detailed comparisons are furnished in Section 2.2 when 137 
the basic model setting is explained. 138 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simultaneous- 139 
move CSR game model with its equilibriums and comparative results. Section 3 considers the 140 
situation that the two members make their CSR decisions sequentially rather than 141 
simultaneously. A discussion about adopting quadratic CSR cost functions is furnished in 142 
Section 4 and the paper concludes with some remarks in Section 5. 143 
2. A Simultaneous-Move CSR Game 144 
2.1. The Final Demand for CSR Products 145 
Consider a two-echelon supply chain with a downstream firm (F) and an upstream supplier (S). 146 
F purchases product/service from S at a wholesale price w  set by S and sells it in a final 147 
market where a large number of firms with a same constant marginal cost ( 0 0c  ) sell identical 148 
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products via price competition. The products sold by F and other firms in the final market are 149 
only differentiated by CSR activities committed by F and S while other firms provide the same 150 
product without CSR commitment. The price competition implies that the equilibrium price of 151 
non-CSR goods ( 0p ) is equal to their marginal cost (i.e. 0 0 0p c  ).1  152 
Assume that each consumer in the final market purchases at most 1 unit and has 153 
homogeneous preference on non-CSR goods provided by other firms, but consumers’ 154 
preferences are heterogeneous on the CSR product provided by the supply chain. To 155 
characterize the difference in CSR preference, it is assumed that a consumer with type   156 
obtains an extra benefit ay b  (relative to 1 unit of non-CSR good) when he/she buys one 157 
unit of good with a given CSR activity ( y ), where 0a  , 0b  , 0  .2 Furthermore, if 158 
0y  , it is assumed that ay b =0 for all 0  . This implies that the extra benefit will be 159 
zero if the supply chain system does not provide a differentiated product with CSR 160 
commitment. 161 
This formulation of extra benefits intends to capture the following impact of CSR 162 
activities. Firstly, ay  reflects a general intuition that each consumer could potentially benefit 163 
from CSR activity y . a  is hereafter called the marginal social-benefit potential (MSBP). For 164 
a given y , the greater the MSBP, the greater the potential social benefit is generated by this 165 
CSR activity. Secondly, b  represents consumer  ’s difficulty to perceive the potential 166 
benefit of y . b  is referred to as the marginal perception difficulty (MPD). A higher MPD 167 
indicates that consumer   feels more difficult to perceive the benefit. Finally, for given a , 168 
y  and b , different  ’s embody heterogeneous preferences for a given CSR activity: a 169 
consumer with a higher   receives a lower level of extra benefit by consuming a unit of the 170 
CSR goods. 171 
Moreover, in the above formulation of consumers’ extra benefit, the potential social 172 
                                                        
1 The zero marginal cost (and the zero equilibrium price) assumption is for notational simplification, which has no material 
impact on the following analysis.  
2 Bagnoli and Watts (2003) also assume an extra benefit of this form for consumers who consume a unit of CSR-linked goods, 
without any exploration on the implications of vertical and horizontal product differentiation. 
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benefit ( ay ) reflects the vertical product differentiation property of a CSR activity because all 173 
consumers would potentially benefit from this CSR activity. On the other hand, consumer’s 174 
perception difficulty ( b ) captures its horizontal product differentiation property because 175 
different consumers tend to have different preferences on a given CSR activity ( y ).3 Thus this 176 
formulation intends to capture both vertical and horizontal product differentiation of CSR 177 
activity.4 This extra benefit formulation captures consumers’ different willingness-to-pay for a 178 
product with a given CSR activity. For instance, De Pelsmacker et al. (2005) empirically show 179 
that the average premium of willingness to pay for fair-trade coffee (relative to no-fair-trade 180 
coffee) varies from 36% for the fair-trade lovers to 3% for the brand lovers.  181 
Next we shall consider the demand function for the CSR product supplied by the 182 
two-echelon supply chain consisting of F and S. Assume that the CSR product is priced at p  183 
by F. Consumer  ’s net surpluses are 0u ay b p    and 0 0u p  if he/she buys (and 184 
consumes) one unit of F’s product with the CSR activity y  and  non-CSR product from 185 
other firms in the final market, respectively, where 0u  is the utility obtained by consuming 186 
one unit of non-CSR product. Then the condition under which consumer   buys F’s CSR 187 
product is 0 0 0ay b p p c     . Finally, let 0  be the critical consumer type satisfying 188 
0ay b p   . All consumers with type 0   will obtain a positive extra benefit by 189 
consuming F’s CSR product, leading to F’s demanded quantity at p  to be ( ) /q ay p b  .  190 
2.2 The Supply Chain Model 191 
Let Fy  and Sy  be the CSR performance achieved via F’s and S’s CSR activities 192 
respectively, and F Sy y y   be the channel CSR performance. The final demand function for 193 
the CSR product provided by the two-echelon supply chain ( ) /q ay p b   can be re-written 194 
                                                        
3 Clearly, for given a , y  and b , a consumer with a large enough   may receive a negative extra benefit by consuming 
one unit of this CSR good. In this case, consumer   personally perceives a negative effect of the social clause corresponding 
to the given CSR. But for the same y , a consumer with a small enough   would envisage a positive effect of this social 
clause. 
4 McWilliams et al. (2006) also believe that CSR can be used as both vertical and horizontal differentiation devices in the field 
of strategic management. 
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as 195 
( )F Sp a y y bq                               (1) 196 
where 0p   and 0q   are the price and demand quantity, respectively. 197 
In demand function (1), for given b  and F Sy y , parameter a  (the MSBP) determines 198 
not only the highest potential willingness-to-pay of consumers in the market segment served by 199 
the supply chain (by setting 0q  ), but also the maximum scale of this market segment (by 200 
setting 0p  ). Thus the MSBP parameter a  reflects the potential to attract consumers to the 201 
CSR product provided by the supply chain. 202 
Parameter b  (the MPD) determines the slope of the demand curve for the CSR product 203 
market segment and depicts the price sensitivity to demand quantity. Then for given F Sy y , 204 
a  and p , parameter b  determines how many consumers will purchase the CSR product 205 
provided by the supply chain. Note further that b  gauges the difficulty for a consumer to 206 
personally perceive the benefit of a given CSR activity. A lower b  indicates that consumers 207 
are easier to perceive the benefit of CSR and tend to get higher extra benefit. Thus the MPD 208 
parameter b  reveals the attractiveness of the CSR product to consumers.  209 
To summarize, a higher MSBP ( a ) or a lower MPD (b ) indicates that the CSR product is 210 
more attractive to consumers, reflecting a higher degree of product differentiation for the CSR 211 
product by the supply chain from other firms’ non-CSR product in the final market. In this case, 212 
the competition tends to be less intensive in the final market for the CSR product by the supply 213 
chain and the non-CSR product by its competitors. Based on the product differentiation 214 
property, the MSBP parameter a  and the MPD parameter b  can be used to represent the 215 
competition intensity that the supply chain has to face in the final market. 216 
Let 0Fc   and 0Sc   be the unit CSR cost incurred by S and F, and 0FC   and 217 
0SC   be the investment budget set aside for CSR activities by F and S, respectively. Then 218 
[0, / ]F F Fy C c  and [0, / ]S S Sy C c  specify the CSR performance bounds for F and S. The 219 
unit CSR cost Fc  and Sc  can be respectively viewed as parameters to measure F’s and S’s 220 
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CSR conduct efficiency at an operational level: a higher unit cost indicates a lower of 221 
operational efficiency. We call Fc  and Sc  respectively the operational efficiency of F’s and 222 
S’s CSR conduct. The CSR investment budget FC  and SC  can be seen as parameters to 223 
represent the levels of the importance that F and S attach to CSR conduct at a strategic level: a 224 
higher budget implies that a supply chain member takes CSR conduct as more important and 225 
then allocates more resources to its CSR activity. FC  and SC  can then measure the strategic 226 
importance of CSR to F and S, respectively. To concentrate on CSR interaction in supply chain 227 
operations, other costs such as the CSR- independent portion of production, stocking, and 228 
delivery costs are normalized to be zero. 229 
The sequence of decisions is as follows: F and S choose 0Fy   and 0Sy   230 
simultaneously (This simultaneous-move assumption is relaxed to be sequential-move in 231 
Section 3), followed by a wholesale price [0, ( )]F Sw a y y   offered by S (as noted by 232 
Cachon (2003), wholesale price contracts are commonly observed in practice). Finally, F 233 
makes its purchase decision q . 234 
The aforesaid CSR conduct model setting, at the first glance, appears similar to existing 235 
literature on quality improvement incentive within a supply chain (see Chao et al. (2009) for an 236 
extensive review). However, our model is significantly different from this body of literature in 237 
two aspects. Firstly, our research assumes a CSR-dependent demand function while the latter 238 
assumes a profitability difference resulted from different quality levels without explicitly 239 
considering the impact of quality improvements on demand. Secondly, our model focuses on 240 
strategic interactions of CSR conduct in a supply chain under wholesale price contracts, while 241 
the latter mainly concentrates on designing quality-related cost sharing contracts between 242 
supply chain members for quality improvement. 243 
Moreover, our assumption of a CSR-dependent demand function can be found in recent 244 
parallel research on supply chain service competition/coordination. Along this line, Tsay and 245 
Agrawal (2000) assume a service-dependent demand function with a substitutive demand 246 
effect between two downstream retailers’ service levels and examine the impact of relative 247 
intensity of price- and service-competition on supply chain operations dynamics. Bernstein and 248 
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Federgruen (2007) use a demand function with the same property as that in Tsay and Agrawal 249 
(2000) to investigate the coordination problem in a supply chain consisting of one common 250 
supplier and N retailers. Rather than focusing on downstream competition in the final market, 251 
our model is devoted to exploring behavioural interactions of CSR conduct within a supply 252 
chain under the assumption that S’s and F’s CSR activities enable the product supplied by the 253 
supply chain to be differentiated both vertically and horizontally from other firms’ non-CSR 254 
products in the final market. To investigate supply chain coordination where two supply chains, 255 
each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer, compete by service levels, Boyaci and 256 
Gallego (2004) adopt the fill rate to measure service levels of the supply chain members, and 257 
assume that final demand of each supply chain is determined only by a relative downstream 258 
service level, but is independent of upstream service level and retail price (This 259 
price-independence assumption is also adopted by Taylor (2002) to describe the impact of sales 260 
effort on final market demand). In our model, we assume that the final market demand quantity 261 
and retail price are positively associated with both the upstream and the downstream CSR 262 
activities. To summarize, the service competition literature is to understand the role of service 263 
in downstream competition in the final market, while our model is to explore the 264 
upstream-downstream behavioural interactions of CSR conduct in a supply chain. In addition, 265 
to describe the impact of service on final demand function, this body of literature follows the 266 
theory of industrial organization and views service as a vertical product differentiation device 267 
(Tirole, 1988).5 With our analysis of the impact of CSR commitment on consumers’ extra 268 
benefits, this research intends to characterize both vertical and horizontal differentiation 269 
properties of CSR conduct. 270 
Finally, a number of authors view CSR conduct as a provision of public goods. Bagnoli 271 
and Watts (2003), Kotchen (2006), and Besley and Ghatak (2007) are concerned with 272 
inter-firm competition where firms strategically provide certain amount of public goods (CSR 273 
performance). And then they analyze the efficiency implication of the public goods provision 274 
according to the corresponding market equilibriums. Rather than examining market efficiency 275 
under inter-firm competition, we focus on behavioural and operational implications of the 276 
strategic cooperation/conflict of CSR conduct within a supply chain under a linear demand 277 
                                                        
5 Quality is also treated as a vertical differentiation device in the theory of industrial organization. 
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function (1), in which the parameters a  and b  reflect competition intensity in the final 278 
market.  279 
2.3. The Equilibriums 280 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this three-stage dynamic game can be solved by 281 
backward induction. 282 
In stage 3, F selects q  to maximize 283 
F ( yF , yS ,w,q)  (a( yF  yS )bq)qwq cF yF  284 
Clearly, F  is concave in q . Then the first-order condition implies 285 




a y y wq y y w
b
                            (2) 286 
In stage 2, in anticipation of F’s reaction captured by (2), S chooses w  to maximize6 287 
2( )( , , , ( , , )) ( , , )
2
F S
S F S F S F S S S S S
a y y w wy y w q y y w wq y y w c y c y
b
       288 
It is easy to check that S  is concave in w . From the first-order condition, we have 289 




a y yw y y                              (3) 290 
Substituting (3) into (2), one can get 291 




a y yq y y
b
                             (4) 292 
With the demand function (1), the final market price is 293 




a y yp y y                              (5) 294 
Further, substituting (3) and (4) into the profit function for S and F, their stage-1 profits 295 
are7 296 
                                                        
6 Here, an alternative assumption is that F and S simultaneously choose q  and w  in the same stage. In this case, S’s profit 
function is written as S ( yF , yS ,w,q)  wq cS yS  and F’s profit function and reaction function are the same as those in the 
sequential-move case. Next, we will show that the unique Nash equilibrium is q  0  and w  a(yF  yS ) . Firstly, for any 
given q  0 , as S’s profit linearly increases in w, S’s optimal reaction is the upper bound w  a(yF  yS ) , which in turn 
makes F choose q  0  by (2). This implies that any q  0  cannot be in a Nash equilibrium. In addition, for q  0 , if S 
chooses w  a( yF  yS ) , then F will choose q  0  as per (2). This confirms that q  0  and w  a(yF  yS )  cannot be 
in an equilibrium, either. Finally, for w  a(yF  yS ) , F’s optimal reaction is q  0 , which makes S indifferent for all w in 
[0,a( yF  yS )]. Therefore, q  0,w  a( yF  yS )   arises as the unique Nash equilibrium.  
7 In reality, the benefit and the cost of CSR activities do not occur simultaneously. In this case, a discount factor can be added 
to discount the stage-3 profit. However, it can be easily checked that this modification does not change the main results. 
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2 2
* ( )( , )
8
F S
S F S S S
a y yy y c y
b
    297 
2 2
* ( )( , )
16
F S
F F S F F
a y yy y c y
b
    298 
Note that these two profit functions are convex and quadratic, so the profit achieves its 299 
maximum at either the upper or lower bound. As such, the optimal reaction of F (S) to its 300 
opponent is to choose 0 or /F FC c  (0 or /S SC c ), depending on the corresponding axis of 301 
symmetry that is contingent upon its opponent’s choice Sy  ( Fy ). 302 
For * ( , )S F Sy y , its axis of symmetry is 24 /S S Fy bc a y  . Then the supplier chooses 303 
/S S Sy C c  if 24 / / (2 )S F S Sbc a y C c  , implying that * *( , / ) ( ,0).S F S S S Fy C c y   304 
Otherwise 0Sy  . To summarize, S’s reaction function is 305 
2
4,    if 
( ) 2
0,    otherwise
S S S
F
S F S S
C bc Cy
y f y c a c
    
                        (6) 306 
In (6), we assume for tie-breaking that S chooses the greater 0Sy  when * *( , ) ( ,0)S F S S Fy y y  . 307 
The same assumption is applied to F’s reaction function (7). 308 
Analogically, F’s reaction function is 309 
2
8,    if 
( ) 2
0,    otherwise
F F F
S
F S F F
C bc Cy
y g y c a c
    
                        (7) 310 
Reaction functions (6) and (7) imply that the greater Sy  ( Fy ) chosen by S (F), the more 311 
likely its opponent will be induced to select its upper bound /F F Fy C c  ( /S S Sy C c ). This 312 
reveals the existence of a mutual incentive between S and F.  313 
The reasons for the existence of this mutual incentive are as follows. Note that (3) and (5) 314 
imply that F’s profit margin, ( ) / 4F Sa y y , increases in Sy . Furthermore, the quantity sold in 315 
the final market also increases in Sy . Thus for a given unit CSR cost Fc , a higher Sy  means 316 
a higher profit margin for each unit of Fy . This is likely to stimulate F to choose a higher Fy . 317 
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On the other hand, since both the wholesale price and order quantity increase in Fy , S will 318 
reap a higher profit for each unit of Sy  when F chooses a higher Fy . Thus a higher Fy  319 









bc Cy a b C c
a c




bc Cy a b C c
a c
   322 
It is clear that #Fy  decreases in a  and SC  but increases in b  and Sc , and that 
#
Sy  323 
decreases in a  and FC  but increases in b  and Fc . 324 
With the reaction functions (6) and (7), the Nash equilibriums of the stage-1 subgame are 325 
derived as shown in Lemma 1. 326 
Lemma 1: (i) if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , or # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   327 
and # ( , , , )F S Sy a b C c  /F FC c , then * *( , ) ( / , / )F S F F S Sy y C c C c is the unique Nash equilibrium. 328 
(ii) if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , then * *( , ) (0, / )F S S Sy y C c  is 329 
the unique Nash equilibrium. 330 
(iii) if # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c , then * *( , ) ( / ,0)F S F Fy y C c  is 331 
the unique Nash equilibrium. 332 
(iv) if #0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c   and #0 ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  , then * *( , )F Sy y   333 
(0,0)  and * *( , ) ( / , / )F S F F S Sy y C c C c  are the two Nash equilibriums. 334 
(v) if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , or # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and 335 
# ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c , then * *( , ) (0,0)F Sy y   is the unique Nash equilibrium. 336 
The proof of this lemma is given in the Appendix A.1. 337 
With the aforesaid equilibrium result for the stage-1 subgame, the subgame perfect Nash 338 
equilibriums of the three-stage game are derived as follows. The proof can be completed by 339 
plugging * *( , )F Sy y  in Lemma 1 into (3) and (4) as well as the profit functions for S and F. 340 
Proposition 1: (i) if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , or # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   341 
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and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c , the equilibrium path of the three-stage game model is 342 
(E)  * * * *( , ) ,
2 4
S S SF F F
S F
S F F S F S
C C CC C Ca ay y w q
c c c c b c c
                          
 343 
and the corresponding equilibrium profits are * * * 2 2( , ) ( / / ) / (16 )F F S F F S S Fy y a C c C c b C     and 344 
* * *( , )S F Sy y   2 2( / / ) / (8 )F F S S Sa C c C c b C  . 345 
(ii) if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , the equilibrium path is 346 
 * * * *( , ) (0, / ) / (2 ) / (4 )F S S S S S S Sy y C c w aC c q aC bc     , and the corresponding 347 
equilibrium profits are * * * 2 2( , ) ( / ) / (16 )F F S S Sy y a C c b   and * * * 2 2( , ) ( / ) / (8 )S F S S S Sy y a C c b C   . 348 
(iii) if # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c , the equilibrium path is 349 
 * * * *( , ) ( / ,0) / (2 ) / (4 )F S F F F F F Fy y C c w aC c q aC bc     , and the corresponding 350 
equilibrium profits are * * * 2 2( , ) ( / ) / (16 )F F S F F Fy y a C c b C    and * * * 2 2( , ) ( / ) / (8 )S F S F Fy y a C c b  . 351 
(iv) if #0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c   and #0 ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  , there exist two 352 
equilibrium paths (E) and  * * * *( , ) (0,0) 0 0F Sy y w q     , and the corresponding 353 
equilibrium profits are * * * 2 2( , ) ( / / ) / (16 )F F S F F S S Fy y a C c C c b C    and * * *( , )S F Sy y   354 
2 2( / / ) / (8 )F F S S Sa C c C c b C  , and * * *( , ) 0F F Sy y   and * * *( , ) 0S F Sy y  , respectively. 355 
(v) if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , or # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and 356 
# ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c , the equilibrium path is  * * * *( , ) (0,0) 0 0F Sy y w q     , and 357 
the corresponding equilibrium profits are * * *( , ) 0F F Sy y   and * * *( , ) 0S F Sy y  . 358 
2.4. Main Results 359 
Next, comparative statics are presented about the equilibriums derived in Section 2.2. In the 360 
following study, it is assumed that changes are examined one at a time. When one parameter is 361 
considered for possible changes, all other parameters are assumed to remain constant. 362 
Proposition 2: Denote the system-wide profit by * * *F S   , then 363 
(i) The equilibrium profits *F , *S  and *  are nondecreasing in SC , FC , and a , 364 
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respectively; 365 
(ii) The equilibrium profits *F , *S  and *  are nonincreasing in Sc , Fc , and b , 366 
respectively. 367 
The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in Appendix A.2. 368 
Remark 1: The exogenous parameters in this model can be categorized into three groups: 369 
market competition intensity parameters a  and b , CSR strategic importance parameters SC  370 
and FC , and CSR operational efficiency parameters Sc  and Fc . Proposition 2 examines the 371 
relationship between equilibrium profit functions (both individual and channel) and these 372 
exogenous parameters. For market parameters a  (the MSBP) and b (the MPD), a  373 
characterizes the level of the vertical product differentiation of CSR performance. Proposition 374 
2 indicates that a higher MSBP (i.e. a higher level of vertical differentiation) leads to higher 375 
profitability (both individually and globally). As for b , the MPD reflects the horizontal 376 
product differentiation role of CSR performance and is interpreted as the difficulty for 377 
consumers to perceive the benefit of CSR activities. Proposition 2 demonstrates that a higher 378 
MPD (i.e. a higher level of perception difficulty or a lower level of horizontal differentiation) 379 
tends to result in lower equilibrium profitability for both individuals and the whole channel. 380 
The intuition is clear: for a higher a  (a lower b ), CSR commitment makes the supply 381 
chain’s product easier to be differentiated from non-CSR goods from competitors and more 382 
attractive to consumers, thereby lowering competition intensity in the final market and 383 
resulting in higher profitability. For strategic importance parameters SC  and FC  and the 384 
operational efficiency parameters Sc  and Fc , due to the symmetry of the game model, it is 385 
only necessary to consider SC  and Sc  as FC  and Fc  can be discussed similarly. 386 
Proposition 2 shows that both individual and channel profitability increases with a higher 387 
social responsibility budget SC  and decreases in the unit CSR cost Sc . Thus proposition 2 388 
furnishes a theoretical basis for supply chain members to highlight the importance with a 389 
higher commitment to CSR activities at strategic level (higher SC  and FC ) and improve their 390 
efficiency in social responsibility conduct at an operational level (lower Sc  and Fc ). This 391 
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result is consistent with the observation that more and more supply chain members (especially 392 
the primary members) have invested more and more resources in addressing social and/or 393 
environmental problems and enhanced their efficiency via technological and/or organizational 394 
improvements. For example, Cone/Roper Cause Related Trends Report (1999) points out that 395 
nearly 50% of larger corporations have programs associated with social issues. 396 
Proposition 3: For the six market, strategic importance and operational efficiency parameters, 397 
SC , FC , a , Sc , Fc  and b ,  398 
(i) given FC , a , Sc , Fc  and b , there exists # # ( , , , , )S S F S FC C C a c c b  such that (E) is the 399 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all #S SC C ; 400 
(ii) given SC , a , Sc , Fc  and b , there exists # # ( , , , , )F F S S FC C C a c c b  such that (E) is the 401 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all #F FC C ; 402 
(iii)given SC , FC , Sc , Fc  and b , there exists 
# # ( , , , , )S F S Fa a C C c c b  such that (E) is 403 
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all #a a ; 404 
(iv) given SC , FC , a, Fc  and b , there exists # # ( , , , , )S S S F Fc c C C a c b  such that (E) is the 405 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all #S Sc c ; 406 
(v) given SC , FC , a, Sc  and b , there exists # # ( , , , , )F F S F Sc c C C a c b  such that (E) is the 407 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all #F Fc c ; 408 
(vi) given SC , FC , a, Sc  and Fc , there exists # # ( , , , , )S F S Fb b C C a c c  such that (E) is the 409 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all #b b . 410 
The proof of Proposition 3 appears in Appendix A.3. 411 
Remark 2: Proposition 3 demonstrates that both S and F, constrained by [0, / ]S S Sy C c  and 412 
[0, / ]F F Fy C c , will choose their maximum CSR performance * /S S Sy C c  and *Fy   413 
/F FC c  as their unique equilibrium as long as any of the six exogenous parameters SC , FC , 414 
a , Sc , Fc , and b  is extended beyond certain critical threshold (
#
S SC C , #F FC C , 415 
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#a a , #S Sc c , #F Fc c , or #b b ). Each threshold therein is determined one at a time by 416 
keeping the other five parameters constant. Note that Proposition 2 reveals that the profit 417 
functions for S, F, and the whole channel increase in SC , FC  and a , and decrease in Sc , Fc  418 




FC , or 419 
#a , or Sc , Fc , or b  is decreased below its upper bound #Sc , #Fc , or 
#b , a win-win scenario 420 
arises in the sense that the supply chain system not only achieves its maximum CSR 421 
performance * /S S Sy C c  and * /F F Fy C c , but also enhances its profitability for both 422 
individual members and the whole channel. This research finding supports existing empirical 423 
studies reported in Margolis and Walsh (2001) and Orlitzky et al. (2003): CSR performance is 424 
positively related to corporate financial performance. Finally, Proposition 3 explores potential 425 
venues for supply chain practitioners to reconcile CSR performance with the profitability of 426 
supply chain operations: choosing CSR initiatives with a higher MSBP and/or a lower MPD, 427 
raising resource commitment to CSR activities, and improving CSR operational efficiency. 428 
Note that the two-echelon supply chain considered here is characterized by strategic 429 
importance parameters ( SC  and FC ) and operational efficiency parameters ( Sc , and Fc ).  430 
We shall examine more carefully how the corresponding system parameter thresholds obtained 431 
in Proposition 3, #SC , 
#
FC , #Sc , and #Fc , are affected by the changes in other exogenous 432 










( , , , , ) min 0 : ( ) 0  or  ( ) 0
480,   if 0 and 0 
2
48                            min , ,  if 0 and 0
2
,  otherwise







C C c c a b C F C F C
bcbc C C
a c a c
bcbc C CC C
a c a c
C
   
        
      (8) 434 
and similarly define as # ( , , , , )F S S FC C c c a b , 
# ( , , , , )S S F Fc C C c a b  and 
# ( , , , , )F S F sc C C c a b  as 435 
 # 1 2( , , , , ) min 0 : ( ) 0  or  ( ) 0F S S F F F FC C c c a b C F C F C             (9) 436 
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 # 1 2( , , , , ) max 0 : ( ) 0  or  ( ) 0S S F F S S Sc C C c a b c F c F c             (10) 437 
 # 1 2( , , , , ) max 0 : ( ) 0  or  ( ) 0F S F s F F Fc C C c a b c F c F c            (11) 438 
Proposition 4: For the four system parameter thresholds given in (8)–(11), 439 
(i) let a be the only variable, if 1 2a a , then # #1 2( ) ( )S SC a C a , # #1 2( ) ( )F FC a C a , 440 
# #
1 2( ) ( )S Sc a c a  and # #1 2( ) ( )F Fc a c a ; 441 
(ii) let b be the only variable, if 1 2b b , then # #1 2( ) ( )S SC b C b , # #1 2( ) ( )F FC b C b , 442 
# #
1 2( ) ( )S Sc b c b  and # #1 2( ) ( )F Fc b c b ; 443 
(iii) let FC  be the only variable, if 
1 2
F FC C , then # 1 # 2( ) ( )S F S FC C C C , # 1 # 2( ) ( )S F S Fc C c C  and 444 
# 1 # 2( ) ( )F F F Fc C c C ; 445 
(iv) let Fc  be the only variable, if 
1 2
F Fc c , then # 1 # 2( ) ( )S F S FC c C c , # 1 # 2( ) ( )F F F FC c C c  and 446 
# 1 # 2( ) ( )S F S Fc c c c ; 447 
(v) let SC  be the only variable, if 
1 2
S SC C , then # 1 # 2( ) ( )F S F SC C C C , # 1 # 2( ) ( )F S F Sc C c C  and 448 
# 1 # 2( ) ( )S S S Sc C c C ; 449 
(vi) let Sc  be the only variable, if 
1 2
S Sc c , then # 1 # 2( ) ( )S S S SC c C c , # 1 # 2( ) ( )F S F SC c C c  and 450 
# 1 # 2( ) ( )F S F Sc c c c . 451 
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Appendix A.4. 452 
Remark 3: Proposition 4 explores how the critical thresholds of the four system parameters are 453 
affected by other parameters, thereby revealing the external market characteristics and the 454 
internal coordination opportunities for a supply chain to achieve win-win performance. Part (i) 455 
indicates that the higher the MSBP (a larger a , indicating a higher degree of vertical 456 
differentiation and pointing to a higher potential willingness-to-pay), the lower the requirement 457 
on the critical thresholds for CSR resource budgets (smaller #SC  and 
# )FC  and operational 458 
efficiency (larger #Sc  and 
#
Fc ) by S and F, thereby making the supply chain easier to attain the 459 
win-win performance scenario (equilibrium E) given in Proposition 3. Conversely, part (ii) 460 
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shows that supply chain members are easier to achieve the win-win performance with lower 461 
critical thresholds for CSR resource budgets (smaller #SC  and 
# )FC  and operational efficiency 462 
(larger #Sc  and 
#
Fc ) when the MPD is lower (a smaller b , indicating a higher degree of CSR 463 
horizontal differentiation and easier for consumers to perceive the potential social benefit). On 464 
the other hand, if the vertical and horizontal differentiation feature of the supply chain CSR 465 
product cannot effectively reduce the competition intensity with non-CSR product in the final 466 
market (i.e., resulting in a smaller a and/or larger b), Proposition 4 (i) and (ii) demonstrate that 467 
higher thresholds of the system parameters (larger #SC  and 
#
FC , attaching a higher strategic 468 
importance level to CSR conduct, or smaller #Sc  and 
#
Fc , corresponding to higher operational 469 
efficiency requirement) are needed to achieve the win-win scenario in Proposition 3, making it 470 
less attainable. This finding is compatible with Bagnoli and Watts’ (2003) conclusion that 471 
social responsibility performance (the provision of public goods) varies inversely with the 472 
competitiveness of private-good market. On the other hand, parts (iii)–(vi) examine how 473 
changes in one of the four internal systematic parameter affect the thresholds of the other three 474 
systematic parameters. For example, (iii) and (v) demonstrate that if S or F commits more 475 
resources to socially responsible activities (a higher budget SC  or FC ), the other member’s 476 
critical resource budget decreases (a lower #FC  or #SC ) and the thresholds of operational 477 
efficiencies become lower for both S and F (larger #Sc  and 
#
Fc ). (iv) and (vi) reveal that the 478 
critical operational efficiency of a member has to be higher (a smaller #Sc  or 
#
Fc ) if the other 479 
member’s operational efficiency is low (a larger Fc  or Sc ), but a higher operational 480 
efficiency (a smaller Fc  or Sc ) helps to reduce the thresholds of resource budgets (lower 
#
FC  481 
and #SC ). (iii)–(vi) shed significant insights into the opportunities of coordinating supply chain 482 
CSR resource commitment (the strategic importance) and operational efficiency based on the 483 
mutual incentive mechanism for the two supply chain members: if a member wishes to induce 484 
the other member to attain the win-win performance, it should increase its CSR resource 485 
budget or CSR operational efficiency so that the corresponding thresholds for its partner can be 486 
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reduced, thereby making it easier for its partner to enter into the commitment. Furthermore, 487 
Proposition 2 points out that both individual and channel profitability will be improved if CSR 488 
resource budgets and operational efficiency are increased. Therefore, this mutual incentive 489 
makes the recommendation implementable for both members to raise their standards in CSR 490 
resource budgets and operational efficiency whereby enhancing their profitability and attaining 491 
the win-win performance scenario.  492 
3 The Role of Prior Commitment 493 
In Sections 2, it is assumed that S and F choose their CSR activity levels simultaneously. This 494 
simultaneous-move assumption cannot accommodate the situation that one supply chain 495 
member announces its commitment to CSR investment prior to the other member’s decision 496 
and how the other member responds to this prior commitment. This section relaxes the 497 
simultaneous-move assumption and considers the case that S and F make their choices 498 
sequentially. Without loss generality, the following study entertains the case that S first chooses 499 
Sy  and, then, F selects Fy , while the other assumptions remain as is in Section 2. This 500 
consideration results in a four-stage sequential-move game: S first chooses Sy , the firm then 501 
selects Fy  in stage 2, followed by S’s choice of w  in stage 3, and finally F’s decision q . 502 
This model can be imagined as an abstraction of a manufacture-distributor supply chain where 503 
the manufacturer (S here) is the primary member and makes the first move. 504 
In this model, for any given Sy  selected by S, F’s reaction is captured by (6) in Section 2 505 
where * /
F F F
y C c  if # 2 8 / / (2 )S S F F Fy y bc a C c    or 0 if # S Sy y . Substituting (6) into 506 





( / ) ,     if 
8( )
,     otherwise
8
F F S




a C c y c y y y
by
a y c y
b
      
 508 
where the subscript “D” is introduced to differentiate the dynamics of this sequential-move 509 
game from the simultaneous- move case in Section 2.   510 
Proposition 5: For the four-stage sequential-move game, 511 
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(E1)  * * * *
2 4
S S SF F F
S F
S F F S F S
C C CC C Ca ay y w q
c c c c b c c
                      
 512 
is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if any of the following three conditions is 513 
satisfied: 514 
(i) # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c ,  515 
(ii) # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c ,  516 
(iii) #0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c   and #0 ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  . 517 
The proof of Proposition 5 is provided in Appendix A.5. 518 
Remark 4: Conditions (i) and (ii) here correspond to Case (i), and condition (iii) is the same as 519 
Case (iv) in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 in Section 2, respectively. In the simultaneous-move 520 
game, (E) arises as the unique desired equilibrium only if (i) or (ii) is satisfied. Proposition 5 521 
demonstrates that another avenue (iii), in addition to (i) and (ii), becomes available for S and F 522 
to reach the unique desired equilibrium (E1) in the sequential-move case. (E) and (E1) are 523 
claimed as the desired equilibrium in the sense that both the CSR performance and profitability 524 
(individual and system-wide) are maximized in these cases compared to other possible 525 
equilibriums. This additional avenue (iii) becomes possible because the first-mover’s prior 526 
commitment to CSR, * /S S Sy C c  or * /F F Fy C c , deters its partner from choosing 0Fy   527 
or 0Sy   due to the profit maximization consideration. Therefore, Proposition 5 can be 528 
interpreted as that a prior commitment to CSR performance from one supply chain member 529 
furnishes another vehicle to achieve the win-win performance scenario, enhances the mutual 530 
incentive between the two supply chain members, and makes the win-win performance more 531 
likely to be attained. This finding helps us to understand the case of Starbucks: while enjoying 532 
a rising tendency of profitability as measured by net earnings and EPS, Starbucks takes its 533 
initiative and introduces a C.A.F.E. certification program to encourage socially and 534 
environmentally responsible practices by its suppliers (Starbucks 2004-2006; Lee et al. 2007). 535 
In short, prior commitment can be viewed as another way (relative to the simultaneous-move 536 
case) to enhance the mutual incentive and foster the realization of the win-win performance 537 
scenario. 538 
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4. Discussions 539 
In this section, the constant marginal CSR cost assumption in Section 2 is relaxed to allow for a 540 
quadratic term in the CSR cost function. Assume that the CSR cost function for F and S are 541 
2 / 2F F F Fc y d y  and 2 / 2S S S Sc y d y , respectively, where 0Fd   and 0Sd  .8 In this case, 542 
the profit functions of S and F in the first stage are 543 
2 2
* 2( ) 1( , )
8 2
F S
S F S S S S S
a y yy y c y d y
b
     544 
2 2
* 2( ) 1( , )
16 2
F S
F F S F F F F
a y yy y c y d y
b
     545 
Proposition 6: Under the quadratic cost function assumption, if 2 / (4 )Sd a b  and 546 
2 / (8 )Fd a b , then all properties in Lemma 1 and Propositions 1-5 remain valid. 547 
The proof of Proposition 6 is provided in Appendix A.6. 548 
Proposition 6 shows that the results in Section 2 and 3 remain true under a quadratic cost 549 
function as long as the coefficients of the quadratic terms are not too big. Note that kd  reflects 550 
the speed at which k ’s marginal cost increases in its CSR performance ky  ( ,k S F ). Thus 551 
the main results are not only true in a constant-marginal-cost setting (Section 2 and 3), but also 552 
remain valid in certain increasing-marginal-cost settings (as long as marginal costs with regard 553 
to CSR activity do not increase too rapidly). 554 
5. Concluding Remarks 555 
In this paper we take a strategic CSR view and assume that relative to a non-CSR product, a 556 
CSR product provides consumers with some extra benefit which varies across those consumers. 557 
This assumption implies that CSR can be used as both a vertical and horizontal product 558 
differentiation device. The demand function is deduced for the CSR product provided by a two- 559 
echelon supply chain based on the price competition equilibrium in the final market. With this 560 
demand function, we investigate how supply chain members interact with respect to their CSR 561 
behaviour from a game-theoretic perspective. Subgame perfect Nash equilibriums are derived 562 
                                                        
8 Röller (1990) theoretically shows that a quadratic cost function can behave well for analyzing global cost concepts (e.g. 
diminishing marginal returns (or increasing marginal cost)) by properly choosing the parameters. In the OM/OR area, Tsay and 
Agrawal (2000), Gurnani et al. (2007), Xiao and Yang (2008) employed quadratic functions of some special form in their 
research. 
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for both simultaneous-move and sequential-move game settings and the impact of exogenous 563 
parameters on this interaction is also examined. Under a set of simple and intuitive assumptions, 564 
the following analytical results are obtained. 565 
(1) There exists a mutual incentive between S and F with respect to their CSR behaviour. 566 
This mutual incentive leads to a win-win performance scenario (E) in terms of both CSR and 567 
profitability performance as long as exogenous parameters are extended beyond certain critical 568 
thresholds (Propositions 2 and 3). 569 
(2) A higher consumer’s marginal social benefit potential (MSBP) and a lower consumer’s 570 
marginal perception difficulty (MPD), pointing to a less intense final market competition 571 
environment due to vertical and horizontal product differentiation roles of CSR performance, 572 
help to lower the critical thresholds of CSR budgets (reflecting its strategic importance) and 573 
operational efficiency by S and F to achieving the win-win performance (parts (i) and (ii) of 574 
Proposition 4).  575 
(3) An increase in one supply chain member’s CSR budget (operational efficiency) tends 576 
to lower its own CSR operational efficiency (budget) threshold and the other member’s CSR 577 
budget and operational efficiency thresholds, thereby making it more easier to attain the 578 
win-win performance scenario (parts (iii)-(vi) of Proposition 4). 579 
(4) A prior commitment to CSR activities by any supply chain member strengthens the 580 
mutual incentive and makes the win-win performance scenario (E1) more likely to be realized 581 
in the sense that this commitment provides additional vehicles for (E1) to arise as the desired 582 
equilibrium (Proposition 5). 583 
Business implications of these research findings are discussed in the remarks. This 584 
research, to a certain extent, helps us to understand how businesses interact with each other 585 
with respect to their CSR conduct. As stated in the basic model settings, information 586 
asymmetry is not considered for the CSR budget or operational efficiency. Further research is 587 
needed to accommodate this information asymmetry and other extensions (for example, adding 588 
supply chain members to introduce competition within a supply chain system) so that a more 589 
complete picture can be portrayed about how supply chain members interact and respond to the 590 
call for socially responsible practices. 591 
Appendices. Proofs of Lemma 1 and Propositions 592 
  24
Appendix A.1. Proof of Lemma 1 593 
(i) As the game is symmetric, it is only necessary to show that # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and 594 
# ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c imply that * *( , ) ( / , / )F S F F S Sy y C c C c  is the unique Nash equilibrium. 595 
As # ( , , , ) 0 ,F S S Fy a b C c y   it follows that ( ) /S F S Sy f y C c   for all [0, / ]F F Fy C c as 596 
per (5). # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  implies that #[ , / ]S S Sy C c   . Since /S S Sy C c , from (6), 597 
one can get ( ) ( / ) /F S S S F Fy g y g C c C c   . Thus * *( , )F Sy y   ( / , / )F F S SC c C c  is a Nash 598 
equilibrium. Suppose that there exists another Nash equilibrium. It has to be one of (0,0) , 599 
(0, / )S SC c , and ( / ,0)F FC c  based on the reaction functions (5) and (6). Consider (0,0)  first. 600 
F’s optimal reaction to S’s choice 0Sy   is either 0Fy   if # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c  , or 601 
/F F Fy C c  if # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c  . The latter case implies that (0,0)  is not a Nash 602 
equilibrium. For the former case, S’s optimal reaction to 0Fy   should be / 0S S Sy C c   603 
based on (5), leading to a contradiction. Similarly, it can be verified that neither (0, / )S SC c  604 
nor ( / ,0)F FC c  is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, 
* *( , )F Sy y   ( / , / )F F S SC c C c  is the unique 605 
Nash equilibrium. 606 
(ii) # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  implies that #[ , / ]S S Sy C c   . That is, for all Sy   607 
[0, / ]S SC c , F’s optimal reaction is ( ) 0F Sy g y  . # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   implies that 608 
( ) /S F S Sy f y C c   for all [0, / ]F F Fy C c . Then the two reaction curves uniquely intersect 609 
at (0, / )S SC c . Thus 
* *( , ) (0, / )F S S Sy y C c  is the unique Nash equilibrium. Due to symmetry 610 
of the game model, (iii) can be proved in the same way. 611 
(iv) #0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c   and #0 ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c   imply that #[0, )Fy   612 
 , #[ , / ]F F Fy C c   , #[0, )Sy    and #[ , / ]S S Sy C c   . Then the reaction curves intersect 613 
twice at (0,0)  and ( / , / )F F S SC c C c , resulting in the two Nash equilibriums. (iv) is thus 614 
proved. 615 
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(v) The symmetry of the game model allows us to consider only the case of 616 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , and the other condition can be confirmed in 617 
the same manner. # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  implies that #[ , / ]S S Sy C c   . Then F’s optimal 618 
reaction is ( ) 0F Sy g y   for all [0, / ]S S Sy C c . So, # ( , , , ) 0F S S Fy a b C c y   implies that 619 
( ) 0S Fy f y  . (v) is proved. 620 
Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 621 
It is shown below that the equilibrium profits *F  and *S  are nondecreasing in SC , 622 
implying that *  is nondecreasing in SC  as well. Remaining claims can be proved in a 623 
similar fashion. Corresponding to the five equilibrium paths in Proposition 1, the equilibrium 624 
profit functions are examined exhaustively as follows: 625 
Case 1: # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , or # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and 626 
# ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c . Due to symmetry of the game, only the first subcase, 627 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , is examined. Given that SC satisfies 628 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , and the other parameters FC , a , Sc , Fc  629 
and b  remain constant, S’s profit function * 2 2( / / ) / (8 )S F F S S Sa C c C c b C     (See 630 
Proposition 1) is quadratic and convex with respect to SC , and its axis of symmetry is 631 
2 24 / /S S S F FC bc a c C c  . Furthermore, # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   implies that 2 28 /S SC bc a  632 
2 24 / /S S F Fbc a c C c  . Then any SC  satisfying # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   is to the right of the 633 
symmetry axis of *S . Thus *S  increases in SC . From F’s profit function given in 634 
Proposition 1, * 2 2( / / ) / (16 )F F F S S Fa C c C c b C    , it immediately follows that *F  increases 635 
in SC .  636 
Case 2: # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c . From Proposition 1, S’s 637 
equilibrium profit function is * 2 2( / ) / (8 )S S S Sa C c b C   , and its axis of symmetry is SC   638 
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2 24 /Sbc a . Again, 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   implies that 2 2 28 / 4 /S S SC bc a bc a  , indicating that SC  639 
satisfying # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   is to the right of the symmetry axis 2 24 /S SC bc a . Thus *S  640 
increases in SC . In addition, * 2 2( / ) / (16 )F S Sa C c b   is clearly increasing in SC . 641 
Case 3: # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c . Proposition 1 gives *S   642 
2 2( / ) / (8 )F Fa C c b  and * 2 2( / ) / (16 )F F F Fa C c b C   , which are independent of SC . Then they 643 
are nondecreasing in SC .  644 
Case 4: #0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c   and #0 ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  . There exist two 645 
subgame perfect Nash equilibriums. For  * * * *( , ) (0,0) 0 0F Sy y w q     , * 0S   and 646 
* 0F   are constant, and hence, nondecresing in SC . For the other equilibrium (E), the profit 647 
functions are the same as those given in Case 1. We show that *S  increases in SC  by 648 
checking that SC  satisfying 
# ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c  is to the right of the symmetry axis of 649 
*
S . Indeed, # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c  implies that 650 
2 2 2 22(4 / / ) 4 / /S S S F F S S F FC bc a c C c bc a c C c     if 24 / / 0S F Fbc a C c  , and it naturally holds 651 
that 2 20 4 / /S S S F FC bc a c C c    whenever 24 / / 0S F Fbc a C c  . The proof of *F ’s increase in 652 
SC  is similar to that in Case 1. 653 
Case 5: If # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , or # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and 654 
# ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c , * 0S   and * 0F  , implying their nondecresing in SC . 655 
The aforesaid five cases indicate the nondecreasing property of the equilibrium profit 656 
functions in SC  when SC  changes within the ranges specified by the corresponding 657 
conditions. As # ( , , , )F S Sy a b C c   24 / / (2 )S S Sbc a C c  decreases in SC , when SC  increases 658 
from 0 to   with other parameters being fixed, a sufficiently small SC  exists such as 659 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c  . For such a given SC , the conditions in Case 2 and the first scenario of 660 
Case 1 do not hold. If the conditions in the second scenario of Case 1 are satisfied, the 661 
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equilibrium profit functions are always characterized by *S  2 2( / / ) / (8 )F F S Sa C c C c b  662 
SC  and *F  2 2( / / ) / (16 )F F S S Fa C c C c b C  , thereby the nondecreasing property of *S  663 
and *F  in SC  is ascertained. For remaining cases, when SC  increases from 0 to  , the 664 
equilibrium may “jump” following one of the four possible paths: Case 5  Case 4  Case 1 665 
(if the initial SC  is selected such that 
# ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c ), 666 
Case 4  Case 1 (if the initial SC  is chosen such that # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and 667 
#0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c  ), Case 5  Case 2  Case 1 (if the initial SC  satisfies 668 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , )S F Fy a b C c  /S SC c ), and Case 3  Case 1 (if the initial SC  is 669 
chosen such that # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c  ). Next, we shall prove that the nondecreasing property 670 
remains valid at the threshold where the equilibrium jumps from one case to another along any 671 
path.  672 
Consider, for example, one equilibrium jump from Case 5 to Case 4. In this case, the 673 
initial SC  and other parameters FC , Fc , a , b , and Sc  satisfy 
# ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and 674 
# ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c . 675 
As #Fy  decreases in SC , a sufficiently large SC  will guarantee that 
# /F F Fy C c . Let 676 
 * #( , , , , ) min 0 : ( , , , ) /S F S F S F S S F FC C c c a b C y a b C c C c    677 
Then for any *S SC C , we have # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c . Lemma 1 implies that the 678 
equilibrium is (0,0)  for all *S SC C , and the corresponding profits are * 0S   and * 0F  . 679 
When *S SC C , Lemma 1 indicates that both (0,0)  and *( / , / )F F S SC c C c  are equilibriums. 680 
For the first scenario, equilibrium profits are both zero for S and F. For the second scenario, 681 
plugging *SC  into the profit functions in Proposition 1 yields  682 
2* *2 2
* * *, ,0 0
8 8
S SF F F F
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F S F S F F
C CC C C Ca aC
c c b c c c b c
                           
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F S F S S S
C C C CC Ca aC
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 685 
This indicates that the equilibrium profit functions for S and F are nondecreasing after the 686 
jump at the threshold *SC . In a similar fashion, one can verify that this nondecreasing property 687 
holds true for all of other possible equilibrium jumps. The proof of Proposition 2 is thus 688 
completed. 689 
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 693 
Given FC , Sc , Fc , a  and b , it is trivial to verify that 1F  decreases in SC  and 2F  694 
decreases in SC  for 
2 24 / / (2 ) / 8 / / (2 )S S S F F F F Fbc a C c C c bc a C c     and achieves its 695 
maximum  24 / /S F Fbc a C c at 0SC  , otherwise, 2F  remains constant at 696 
28 / / (2 )F F Fbc a C c . Moreover, both 1F  and 2F  are continuous in SC . 697 
For 1F , since 2 2 21(0) max{4 / ,8 / / } 0S F F FF bc a bc a C c    and 1( )F    , the continuity 698 
and monotonicity of 1F  implies that there exists a unique 1
#
SC  such that 1 0F   for any 699 
1
#
S SC C   700 
For 2F , If 
28 / / (2 ) 0F F Fbc a C c  , then 2 0F   for any 0SC  ; if 701 
28 / / (2 ) 0F F Fbc a C c   and 24 / / 0S F Fbc a C c  , then 2 0F   for any 0SC  ; if 702 
28 / / (2 ) 0F F Fbc a C c   and 24 / / 0S F Fbc a C c  , then there exists a unique 2# [0, )SC    703 
such that 2 0F   for any 2#S SC C  due to the monotonic decreasing property of 2F .  704 
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     (8) 706 
Finally, since # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  are equivalent to 1 0F   707 
and # ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c  are equivalent to 2 0F  , then #S SC C  708 
implies (E) is the unique equilibrium by Lemma 1. Part (i) of this proposition is thus proved.  709 
Parts (ii) – (vi) can be verified in the similar fashion. Proposition 3 is then proved. 710 
Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 4 711 
The following proof confirms that # #1 2 1 2( ) ( )S Sa a C a C a    and remaining parts can be 712 
proved similarly. Given FC , Sc , Fc and b , assume that 1 2a a . As 1F  and 2F  decreases in 713 
a , 2( , ) 0i SF C a   implies 1( , ) 0i SF C a   for any SC , 1, 2i  . Thus 714 
   1 2 2 2 1 1 2 10 : ( , ) 0  or  ( , ) 0 0 : ( , ) 0  or  ( , ) 0S S S S S SC F C a F C a C F C a F C a        715 
By the definition of #SC  in (7) and the nonincreasing property of iF  in SC , we have 716 
# #
1 2( ) ( )S SC a C a . The proof of this proposition is thus completed. 717 
Appendix A.5. Proof of Proposition 5 718 
First, we prove that if # ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c , (E1) arises as the 719 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the four-stage sequential-move game. 720 
# ( , , , ) 0F S Sy a b C c   implies that S chooses * /S S Sy C c  in stage 1 regardless of F’s choice in 721 
stage 2. Given S’s decision * /S S Sy C c  in stage 1, F will choose * /F F Fy C c  in stage 2 due 722 
to # ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c . Thus (E1) is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Due to 723 
the symmetry of the game, one can show that (E1) is the unique equilibrium if 724 
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# ( , , , ) 0S F Fy a b C c   and # ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c  in a similar way. 725 
Next, we shall show that if #0 ( , , , ) /F S S F Fy a b C c C c   and #0 ( , , , ) /S F F S Sy a b C c C c  , 726 
(E1) is also the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These conditions imply that if S 727 
chooses * 0Sy  , F will respond with * 0Fy  , and if S selects * /S S Sy C c , F’s optimal 728 
response is * /F F Fy C c . S’s profit can be correspondingly given as * *(0) (0,0) 0SD S    and 729 
* *( / ) ( / , / )SD S S S F F S SC c C c C c   2 2 *( / / ) / (8 ) 0 (0)F F S S S SDa C c C c b C      (see the proof 730 
of Proposition 2). Therefore, S’s optimal decision is * /S S Sy C c  in stage 1, leading to the 731 
unique equilibrium (E1). This completes the proof of Proposition 5. 732 
Appendix A.6. Proof of Proposition 6 733 
Proof: 2 / (4 )Sd a b  and 2 / (8 )Fd a b  imply that *S  and *F  are strictly convex in Sy  734 
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Following the same approaches in Section 2, it can be shown that S’s and F’s reaction 737 
functions are 738 
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 740 
where  2 2 /k k k k kc c d C d    is the positive solution to 2 / 2k k k k kc y d y C   ( ,k S F ), i.e. 741 





24 ( 4 )( , , , ) S S S SS SF S S
S
c c d Cbc a bdy a b C c
a d





28 ( 8 )( , , , ) F F F FF FS F F
F
c c d Cbc a bdy a b C c
a d
                 (13) 745 
Finally, following the step-by-step proofs of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1-5, we can verify 746 
that Proposition 6 is true if (1) # ( , , , )F S Sy a b C c  and 
# ( , , , )S F Fy a b C c  therein are respectively 747 
replaced with (12) and (13), and (2) /k kC c  is replaced with  2 2 /k k k k kc c d C d    ( ,k S F ) . 748 
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